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CASES NOTED
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE INHERENTLY
DANGEROUS ACTIVITY DOCTRINE TO
EMPLOYEES OF AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR
An independent contractor, hired by the defendant power company,
employed the plaintiff to construct and energize an electrical distribution
system. The plaintiff was injured when fellow employees negligently ener-
gized a wire he was attempting to insulate. The Second District Court of
Appeal reversed the decision of the trial court and found the defendant
liable, though not negligent, on the basis that the activity was inherently
dangerous and involved the use of electricity, a dangerous instrumentality.
On certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, held, reversed: a contractee,
in the absence of negligence, is not liable to an employee of an independent
contractor when the contract requires the performance of an inherently
dangerous activity. Nor can liability to the employee be predicated upon
the Florida dangerous instrumentality doctrine.* Florida Power & Light
Co. v. Price, 170 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1964).
Early common law shielded the employer of an independent contrac-
tor from liability for the torts committed by the contractor.' Immunity
from suit ran against third parties and the contractor's employees alike.
By the mid-nineteenth century, case law accorded third persons a right of
action against the employer, but only if the contract called for the per-
formance of an unlawful act,2 a nondelegable duty,' "or" 4 an inherently
* It is interesting to initially note that the instant case is unique in that no other case has
considered the contractee's liability under both of these legal theories.
For a general discussion of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine as it existed at early
common law, see Horack, The Dangerous Instrument Doctrine, 26 YArE L.J. 224 (1917).
For a development of the doctrine in Florida law, see Comment, The Dangerous Instru-
mentality Doctrine: Unique Automobile Law In Florida, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1952).
1. Early juristic opinion in England viewed the employer-independent contractor
relationship as necessarily preclusive of any form of vicarious liability. The inability to
control the performance of the work, which was the major criteria employed in classifying
any particular employment situation as one of employer-independent contractor or master,
gave rise to a policy "that it would be over-harsh to make men liable not only for acts
which they cannot practically control in detail, but for the acts of persons over whom they
have no control at all." POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 130 (1882). Thus,
during the nineteenth century the limits of vicarious liability was generally confined to the
masters of servants and partners. Williams, Liability for Independent Contractors, Carm. L.J.
180 (1956).
2. The employer's legal responsibility was first established in that class of cases wherein
the employment contract was for the performance of an unlawful act. Ellis v. Sheffield Gas
Consumers Co., 2 El. & BI. 767, 118 Eng. Rep. 955 (Q.B. 1853) and Hale v. Sittingbourne &
Sheerness Ry., 6 H. & N. 488, 158 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ex. 1861) are generally cited as the leading
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dangerous activity.5 Along with these exceptions, a distinction between
third persons and employees of the independent contractor developed.
The scope of this note is primarily limited to an examination of the inher-
ently dangerous activity exception as it relates to independent contractor's
employees.6
The majority of jurisdictions that have litigated the issue maintain
that the benefit of the inherently dangerous activity exception to the
employer's nonliability extends only in favor of third persons.7 Most deci-
cases in this area. Jolowicz, Liability for Independent Contractors in the English Common
Law, 9 STAN. L. REv. 690 (1957).
3. A difference of opinion exists as to the historical beginning of the nondelegable duty
exception. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 432 (1926) traces the rule to the land-
mark decision of Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330, while Jolowicz, supra note 2,
maintains that the ratio decidendi of the nondelegable duty exception was first formulated
in Pickard v. Smith, 10 C.B. (n.s.) 470, 142 Eng. Rep. 535 (C.P. 1861).
4. Technically the use of a disjunctive in so far as it connotes a conceptual dichotomy is
not wholly born out by authority. For instance, "[t]he California cases make this relation-
ship [nondelegable duties and inherently dangerous activities] highly important since there
appears to be no case in which liability has been imposed on the basis of inherent danger
exception. The courts have often used the term 'inherent danger,' but always in connection
with a primary basis for liability." Note, Liability For the Torts of Independent Contractors
In California, 44 CAuT. L. REv. 762, 764 n.19 (1956).
An awareness that a hard and fast distinction between these two exceptions can not in
every instance be made is also revealed in HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.11 n.51 (1956)
wherein Harper states that the inherently dangerous exception can be rationalized in terms
of nondelegable duty. For a treatment which separates these two bases for liability, see
PROSSER, TORTS, ch. 13, § 70 (3d ed. 1964).
Nor are judicial decisions unresponsive to the overlapping of these categories. In Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App. 425, 452, 222 S.W.2d 854, 866 (1948), the
court, classifying electricity as inherently dangerous, states: "Where . . . in the natural course
of things mischevious consequences must be expected to arise, unless means are adopted by
which such consequences may be prevented, then the owner is under the non-delegable duty
to see that appropriate preventative measures are adopted."
5. Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876) is frequently cited as the leading case which
first established the inherently dangerous activity exception. Eaton v. Weir, 125 So.2d 115
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1960) ; Silveus v. Grossman, 307 Pa. 272, 161 At. 362 (1932) ; Harper,
The Basis of the Immunity of An Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494
(1934); MoRus, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1952); Note, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 245 (1963);
cf. Annot. 23 A.L.R. 1084, 1085 (1923).
6. An interesting aspect of the noted topic lies in a failure of other commentators to
succinctly state a trend in the law. But the fact is that no such trend appears to be percept-
ible. For example, it was not until 1962 that the Restatement on Torts, infra note 11,
unequivocally excluded employees from the rules stated in §§ 413, 416 and 427 which other-
wise would be applicable to the instant case. In that year, however, California in Wollen v.
Aerojet Gen. Gorp., 20 Cal. App. 12, 369 P.2d 708 (1962), allowed a legal representative of
an employee to recover from the contractee for the death of the employee. Although the
Restatement is not mentioned in the instant decision, Florida now apparently subscribes to
that position. A good criticism of the California decision can be found in Note 51 CALIF. L.
REV. 245 (1963).
7. See Corban v. Skelly Oil Co., 256 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1958) (applying Arkansas law);
Hurst v. Gulf Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1958) (applying Texas law); Sword v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1958); Cagle v. McQueen, 200 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1952)
(applying Texas law); Union Tank & Supply Co. v. Kelly, 167 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1948)
(dicta); Terry v. Green, 164 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Ark. 1958); Burke v. Ireland, 26 App. Div.
487, 50 N.Y. Supp. 369 (1898); -Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. O'Connor, 50 Ohio App.
30, 197 N.E. 428 (1935); Silveus v. Grossman, 307 Pa. 272, 161 Atl. 362 (1932); Hader v.
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sions while devoid of policy considerations' reflect an unwillingness of
judges to include the contractor's employees within the exception on the
ground that as between the contractee and the employee, the latter is
better equipped to perform the work.'
The rationalizations formulated in support of the majority position
Coplay, 410 Pa. 139, 189 A.2d 271 (1963); Perez v. Hernandez, 317 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.
1958) ; Nance Exploration Co. v. Texas, 305 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App. 1957) ; Texas EIec. Serv.
Co. v. Holt, 249 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App. 1952); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bell, 180 S.W.2d
970 (Tex. App. 1943). See generally RESTATEMENT (Second), TORTS, ch. 15 (Tent. Draft No.
7, 1962) wherein the Institute unequivocally excludes employees of the contractor. The reason
for doing so is stated in note 11 infra.
8. The failure of American courts to invoke considerations of policy parallels the
development of this area of tort law in English jurisprudence. Since PoLLocX, ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS (1882), very little has been written on the policy question. How-
ever, "[olne of the most disturbing features of the law of tort in recent years is the way in
which the courts have extended, seemingly without any reference to considerations of policy,
the liability for independent contractors." Williams, Liability For Independent Contractors,
CAzB. L.J. 180 1956.
9. In Hammond v. City of El Dorado Springs, 362 Mo. 530, 242 S.W.2d 479 (1951), the
court reasoned that because the employee's injury stemmed from a condition he was correct-
ing under a contract to repair the contractee could not be held liable. The same court thirty-
nine years earlier in a dissenting opinion distinguished between the contractor and his
employee in the following manner:
This reasoning [the majority position] does not involve, as has been suggested, the
liability of the owner to the independent contractor himself. The latter plies his
particular trade for livelihood. This implies a representation on his part that he is
possessed of the requisite skill and competency. When he solicits employment in his
own calling, he cannot ask the employer, who knows nothing of his special craft, to
indemnify him against his own lack of qualification for his own trade, or against
his own negligence.
Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 14, 68, 145 S.W. 16, 33 (1912) (dissenting opinion). But in
Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d 617 (1928), a negro
laborer was allowed to recover from the independent contractor's employer.
Seemingly applying the Salmon rationale to an employee, a New York appellate court in
denying -recovery stated in dicta: "In fact, I should be inclined to think they [the employees]
were all well able to judge the character and competency of their co-servants as the owner
was, and at all times the determination whether to continue in the service or leave it rested
solely upon them." Burke v. Ireland, 26 App. Div. 487, 493, 50 N.Y. Supp. 369, 372-373
(1898).
The jurisdiction of Pennsylvania does not recognize the inherently dangerous activity
rule even as to third persons on the broad ground that "[wiork not ordinarily hazardous is,
when done by the unskillful and careless, much more dangerous than is work ordinarily
classified as 'dangerous' when done by the skillful and careful." Silveus v. Grossman, 307 Pa.
272, 277, 161 Atl. 362, 364 (1932).
Similarly, the courts of Ohio, in denying recovery, have stressed the fact that the employee
was accustomed to working in the dangerous situation and knew of the dangerous conditions
entailed in the work. Schwarz v. General Elec. Realty Corp., 163 Ohio St. 354, 126 N.E.2d
906 (1955); Wellman v. East Ohio Gas Co., 160 Ohio St. 103, 113 N.E.2d 629 (1953);
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. O'Connor, 50 Ohio App. 30, 197 N.E. 428 (1935). But see
King v. Morrison Motor Freight Lines, 111 Ohio App. 172, 171 N.E.2d 173 (1959) wherein
the employee prevailed on the ground that his employer was unaware of the hazard involved
due to the misrepresentation of the contractee.
Reasoning of similar import exists in English law. "Parker J. in Bloomstein v. Railway
Executive ([1952] 2 All E.R. 418) held that the rule was that the occupier's duty of care to
invitees may be performed by delegating to an apparently competent contractor if the
occupier has to rely upon the contractor's technical knowledge; but this does not apply if
no special knowledge is involved." Williams, Liability For Independent Contractors, CAmn.
L.J. 180, 181 (1956).
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are diffused, and generally no unanimity is ascertainable with respect to
the reasoning employed. Major reliance is placed upon the fact that the
employer owes no special duty to the plaintiff by virtue of the fact that
the activity engaged in is inherently dangerous or that if the nature of
the work does create a special duty, it may nevertheless be delegated by
contract to the independent contractor."0 The Restatement of Torts ex-
cludes employees as a class entitled to the benefit of the exception on the
ground that in almost all jurisdictions workmen's compensation acts afford
the plaintiff sufficient protection. 1 Actions brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act fail since the negligence complained of is not that of a
governmental employee.' 2 One decision implied that as a matter of law,
employees as a class are contributorily negligent when engaging in inher-
10. One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer
should recognize as necessarily creating, during its progress, conditions containing an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is
subject to liability for bodily harm caused to them by the absence of such precau-
tions, if the employer
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such pre-
cautions, or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the
taking of such precautions.
RESTATEMENT (Second), ToRTs, § 413, at 1118-1119 (1934).
11. One reason why such -responsibility has not developed has been that the
workmen's recovery is now, with relatively few exceptions, regulated by workmen's
compensation acts, the theory of which is that the insurance out of which the
compensation is to be paid is to be carried by the workmen's own employer, and
of course premiums are to be calculated on that basis. While workmen's com-
pensation acts not infrequently provide for third-party liability, it has not been
regarded as necessary to impose such liability upon one who hires the contractor,
since it is to be expected that the cost of the workmen's compensation insurance
will be included by the contractor in his contract price for the work, and so will
in any case ultimately be borne by the defendant who hires him.
RESTATEMENT (Second), TORTS, Special Note, ch. 15 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). See Corban
v. Skelly Oil Co., 256 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1958) for an interesting approach to the problem.
The court in dictum suggested that if the activity is inherently dangerous then the
employee would be the servant of the contractee and as such would be limited to his
workmen's compensation benefits. Corban v. Skelly Oil Co., supra at 781. See however
Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 Ili. 2d 431, 150 N.E.2d 134 (1958) for a result contrary to the
Restatement rationale. The case can be distinguished, however, on the ground that a
nondelegable duty imposed by statute was involved.
12. The Federal Tort Claims Act imposes liability upon the federal government for
. civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, ... for injury
or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
Hopson v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Ark. 1956) established that "liability
under the Act cannot be predicted upon the alleged negligence of an independent contractor
or its employees, when said contractor and employees are not employees of the United States."
Id. at 815. However, if a local statute imposes a nondelegable duty on the government
a recovery may be had. Grogan v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Ky. 1963)
(discussing Schmid v. United States, 273 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1959)). But see Stratton v.
United States, 213 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) wherein it was unequivocally held that
"liability under this Act cannot arise by virtue of ownership by the United States of 'an
inherently dangerous commodity' or property, or of engaging in an 'extra-hazardous'
activity. Id. at 560. It is to be noted that in the latter case strict liability was contended.
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ently dangerous work.'" Other rationales have stressed the following two
factors: the lack of the contractee's control over the performance of the
work which is inherent in the relationship;14 and, the anticipation that
the application of the exception in favor of employees would lead to busi-
ness stagnation. 15
Four minority jurisdictions permit employees to recover under the
inherently dangerous activity exception. 6 These forums generally stress
the presence of ultimate benefit to the employer, which will accrue from
the performance of the work,' the fact that the employer knows that
laborers must be employed by the contractor to assist in performing the
work,'8 and the "law's policy as to the liability for risks broadly incidental
13. "This doctrine of inherent danger inures to the benefit of third persons who have
been injured without negligence on their part. It does not inure to one actively participating
in the performance of the work." Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. O'Connor, 50 Ohio.
App. 30, 34, 197 N.E. 428, 429-430 (1935).
14. "The very phrase 'independent contractor' implies that the contractor is in-
dependent in the manner of doing the work contracted for." Hader v. Coplay Cement
Mfg. Co., 410 Pa. 139, 151, 189 A.2d 271, 277 (1963). See also Blattner, Employer Im-
munity in Independent-Contractor Torts in Ohio, 9 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 287 (1960); Note,
Liability for the Torts of Independent Contractors in California, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 762,
763 (1956).
15. Silveus v. Grossman, 307 Pa. 272, 277, 161 At. 362, 364 (1932).
16. California: Woolen v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 57 Cal. App. 2d 407, 369 P.2d 708 (Sup.
Ct. 1962). Missouri: Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d
617 (1928). North Carolina: Watson v. Black Mountain Ry., 164 N.C. 176, 80 S.E. 175
(1913); Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., 190 N.C. 632, 130 S.E. 739 (1925). New Jersey:
Marion v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 72 N.J. Super. 146, 178 A.2d 57 (1962) (citing
Bergquist v. Penterman, 46 N.J. Super. 74, 134 A.2d 20 (App. Div. 1957)).
Dictum in several decisions indicate that other jurisdictions may follow the minority
position. Looker v. Gulf Coast Fair, 203 Ala. 42, 81 So. 832 (1919) (implication) ; Chicago
Economic Fuel Gas Co. v. Myers, 168 Ill. 139, 48 N.E. 66 (1897); Looney v. Prest-O-Lite
Co., 65 Ind. App. 617, 117 N.E. 678 (1917); Laffery v. United States Gypsum Co., 92
Kan. 475, 141 Pac. 241 (1914); Peck v. Woomack, 65 Nev. 184, 192 P.2d 874 (1948); Stevens
v. United Gas & Elec. Co., 73 N.H. 159, 60 Atl. 848 (1905); Oklahoma City v. Caple, 187
Okl. 600, 105 P.2d 209 (1940) (implication) ; International Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn.
App. 425, 222 S.W.2d 854 (1948) (but the decision is distinguishable on the ground that
the employee was not the servant of the negligent contractor and therefore was a third
person) ; Davis Bakery, Inc. v. Dozier, 139 Va. 628, 124 S.E. 411 (Ct. App. 1924).
17. Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., supra note 17, at 742 (cited in Price v. Florida Power
& Light Co., 159 So.2d 654 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963)). The language of the court in the Greer case
suggests that the employee would be allowed a recovery where a third person would not.
In this respect the following quote is unique:
The rule exempting an owner or contractor from liability for the negligence of an
independent contractor to a stranger or third person does not necessarily exempt such
owner or contractor from liability to the servant or employee of the independent
contractor who is injured while engaged in work for the ultimate benefit of such
owner or contractor. There is a relationship between the owner or contractor and
the servant or employee of the independent contractor which may impose upon the
former duties which the law does not impose upon him with respect to strangers
or third persons. Ibid.
See 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 600 at 353 (1948) for a list of cases supporting the
proposition that the liability of the employer to the independent contractor's employees
is not as extensive as his liability to third persons.
18. Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 14, 145 S.W. 16 (1912) (dissenting opinion). Cf.
Simonton v. Perry, 62 S.W. 1090 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
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to the enterprise of the employer."19 One court reasoned that, since recov-
ery is accorded to third persons not in contractual privity with .the em-
ployer, the servant of the independent contractor likewise not in privity
should also be entitled to remedial rights.2°
An analysis of the cases reveals that the characterization of any
particular fact pattern as an inherently dangerous activity is a difficult
matter. Furthermore, judicial authorities are not in agreement as to the
test to be applied.2 For instance, blasting with dynamite, 2 excavating a
wall of a building,2" and erecting a building24 or structure25 have been clas-
sified as inherently dangerous. On the other hand, drilling of pattern shot
holes,28 trucking of a 35,000 pound printing press,27 testing by compressed
air,28 laying a "cold" wire by experienced linemen,2 9 among other activi-
ties,"o have not been so classified. While some of the apparent inconsisten-
19. Marion v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 72 N.J. Super. 146, 154, 178 A.2d 57,
61 (1962) wherein the question is posed: "Is the risk fairly allocable to the enterprise?"
However, on other grounds the employee was denied recovery.
20. Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d 617 (1928).
But see Simonton v. Perry, 62 S.W. 1090 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) wherein the court observed:
"we . . . find the question to arise only between the employer and persons sustaining no
relation of privity, contractual or otherwise, with the employer or contractor." Id. at 1091.
21. The following are the cases and key phrases mentioned by the courts: Price v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 159 So.2d 654 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) (whether danger inheres
in the performance of the work); Looney v. Prest-O-Lite Co., 65 Ind. App. 617, 117 N.E.
678 (1917) (dicta: where the contract requires the performance of work intrinsically or
necessarily dangerous however skillfully -performed); Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice &
Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d 617 (1928) (where the work is of a character from which
danger is likely to arise unless precautionary measures are adopted) ; Peck v. Woomack, 65
Nev. 184, 192 P.2d 874 (1948) (when the contract is for work which, because of its nature
or requirements, is inherently dangerous); Marion v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 72
N.J. Super. 146, 178 A.2d 57 (1962) (a danger created by the work regardless of reasonable
care on the part of the contractor responsible for such an undertaking) ; Kaw Boiler Works v.
Frymyer, 100 OkI. 81, 227 Pac. 453 (1924) (injuries resulting from the doing of the work,
which are the natural and probable consequences of the usual methods of performing such
work).
Harper, noting that the concept is an illusive one, was of the opinion that although the
activity need not be extra-hazardous it is not sufficient that the situation is merely dangerous
enough so that reasonable care will require the taking of precautions. HARPER & JA MES, TORTS,
§ 26.11, n.51 (1956). Prosser states the criterion to be a "high degree of risk in relation
to the particular surroundings, or some rather specific risk or set of risks to those in the
vicinity, recognizable in advance as calling for definite precautions." PROSSER, TORTS, ch. 13,
§ 70 (3d ed. 1964).
22. Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., 190 N.C. 632, 130 S.E. 739 (1925) (classifying
dynamite as a "dangerous instrumentality"); Watson v. Black Mountain Ry., 164 N.C. 176,
80 S.E. 175 (1913).
23. Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d 617 (1928).
24. Stevens v. United Gas & Elec. Co., 73 N.H. 159, 60 Atl. 848 (1905).
25. Peck v. Woomack, 65 Nev. 184, 192 P.2d 874 (1948).
26. Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 14, 145 S.W. 16 (1912).
27. Nini v. Culberg, 7 Cal. App. 146 (1st Dist. 1960).
28. Breece v. J. F. Chapman & Son, Inc., 302 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1962).
29. Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Holt, 249 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App. 1952).
30. Union Tank & Supply Co. v. Kelly, 167 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1948) (unloading, in the
night, a box car of heavy steel sheets) ; Terry v. A. P. Green Fire Brick Co., 164 F. Supp.
1965]
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cies can be explained in terms of collateral negligence,"' most decisions
appear to turn on an arbitrary decision of the court as to the character-
ization of the activity in question. 2
By its decision in the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court has
adopted the majority position. In this respect the writer concurs. Issue,
however, is taken with the lack of clarity evidenced in the court's analysis.
Although the question presented was one of first impression, the court
clouds this fact by referring to an early Florida Supreme Court decision
of questionable application."3 Furthermore, although the "dangerous in-
strumentality" cases relied upon 4 seemingly lead inevitably to the conclu-
184 (E.D. Ark. 1958) (backing a dump truck up an earthen ramp); Bedford v. Bechtel
Corp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 401, 342 P.2d 495 (1959) (erecting oil storage tanks) ; Gadsden v.
Craft & Co., 173 N.C. 418, 92 S.E. 174 (1917) (constructing a reenforced concrete bridge) ;
Hess v. Bernheimer & Swartz, Pilsener Brewing Co., 219 N.Y. 415, 114 N.E. 808 (Ct. App.
1916) (varnishing beer vats); Kuhn v. P. J. Carlin Constr. Co., 154 Misc. 892, 278 N.Y.
Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (transporting workmen by steamship); Visconsi v. Staufert,
45 Ohio App. 112, 186 N.E. 829 (1933) (constructing a dwelling); Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Bell, 180 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. App. 1957) (digging a sluch pit by blasting); Perez v.
Hernandez, 317 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App. 1958) (inflating tires).
31. For a general discussion of this doctrine see PROSSER, TORTS, § 70, at 488 (3d ed.
1964).
32. For example, compare the facts existing in Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Holt, supra
note 7, with those of the instant case. In the Texas case the workman was to install fuses
on a newly strung electrical wire. The contracting parties originally contemplated that all
work upon the line was to be performed while the line was free from electricity. The line
was subsequently energized and notice of that fact was given to the workman's foreman.
While attempting to install the fuses in compliance with orders given by his master, the
workman was electrocuted. Similarly, in the instant case the "plan of construction was to
make the new wires safe before energizing." Price v. Florida Power & Light Co., 159 So.2d
654, 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). Note also that the Second District Court of Appeal held that
as a matter of law the power company was not negligent in failing to de-energize the line
upon which the plaintiff was working. Insofar as both cases involved work which, as
originally planned, was not dangerous, the results reached are incongruous.
33. The Florida Supreme Court quoted from Gulf Refining Co. v. Wilkinson, 94 Fla.
664, 114 So. 503 (1927) wherein it previously relied upon the following rule stated in 25
C.J. 197: "By the weight of authority it seems that a principal is not liable for the negligence
of an independent contractor, although the work to be done is intrinsically dangerous,
so long as no negligence can be imputed to him in employing such contractor . .. ."
Significantly, the action in the Gulf case was brought by a third person against the alleged
employer of an independent contractor for the negligence of an employee of the con-
tractor. Thus the case and authority relied upon stands for the proposition that an employer
of an independent contractor cannot be held liable to a third person for the negligence of
a servant of the contractor when the work engaged in is inherently dangerous. The Second
District Court of Appeal recognized this distinction.
It should be noted that the Gull decision was decided in 1927-a date when few, if any,
cases concerning the right of an employee to recover from the contractee under the inherently
dangerous activity exception had been litigated. Subsequent to that date the majority of
cases cited in notes 7 and 17 were decided. The court in the instant case should have
examined these decisions.
34. In refusing to engraft the dangerous instrumentality doctrine onto an independent
contractual relationship the court analogized to the facts and holdings appearing in Fry v.
Robinson Printers, Inc., 155 So.2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) and Petitte v. Welch, 167 So.2d
20 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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sion adopted by the court, 5 other Florida cases not mentioned by the
court could support a contrary result.8 6
Lack of clarity in approach to the legal theories presented is also
evident. By analogizing the factual pattern presented to selected Florida
"dangerous instrumentality" cases,87 the court interrelated the "inherently
dangerous activity" rule and the "dangerous instrumentality doctrine."
One wonders whether the court perceived an a fortiori relationship between
the two doctrines. Such co-mingling in analysis is certain to result in future
confusion in an already confused area of the law. As these areas are in
their infancy-separation of thought should be pursued.
BRUCE ALEXANDER
SEARCH-INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC ARREST
Police officers possessed information that the defendant's driver's
license had been revoked. They pursued and stopped him intending
merely to write a traffic ticket. Upon learning it was his fourth offense,
the officers "frisked" and searched the defendant pursuant to a directive
35. For instance, the Fry case, supra note 35 involved the question of an. automobile
owner's liability to an employee of a service station negligently injured by a fellow employee
with whom the automobile was entrusted. Quoting from that decision, the court adopted
the following reasoning as it relates to the particular facts in the instant case:
Indeed, we find nothing in the decisions applying the 'dangerous instrumentality
doctrine' to justify a holding that . . . he is liable solely by reason of ownership
for the negligent operation thereof by one employee resulting in injury to another
employee of the service station, both being engaged in performing duties in
connection with servicing or repairing the automobile at the time of injury.
(Emphasis of the court.)
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So.2d 293, 296 (1964).
36. Inasmuch as Florida courts have suggested that liability predicated upon the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine exists irrespective of "the particular legal relationship
which exists between the possessor and the owner," authority existed for a contra holding.
Martin v. Lloyd Motor Co., 119 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960). See also Frankel v.
Fleming, 69 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
Indeed, the lower appellate court in the instant case stated:
The courts of Florida have made it clear that it is not possible for an owner of a
dangerous instrumentality to insulate himself from liability by the device of an
independent contractor relationship, since, as a matter of law, such responsibility
of control cannot be delegated. ...
Price v. Florida Power & Light Co., 159 So.2d 654, 659 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
37. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920), is the
leading Florida case which classified the automobile as a dangerous instrumentality. See the
following cases for further applications of the doctrine: Barth v. City of Miami, 146 Fla.
542 1 So.2d 574 (1941) (a motor truck); Shattuck v. Mullen, 115 So.2d 597 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1959) (an airplane) ; Skinner v. Ochiltree, 148 Fla. 705, 5 So.2d 605 (1942) (firearms).
The ratio decidendi of the cases reveals that the hallmark of any dangerous instrumentality
lies in a determination of whether the particular instrumentality is so dangerous in operation
as to warrant the imposition of vicarious liability upon the party who entrusts the instru-
ment to another.
It should be noted that the court in the instant decision did not expressly classify
electricity as a dangerous instrumentality. However, that finding is implicit in both the
appellate court decision and the supreme court opinion.
